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Ill 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant Douglas E. Larsen's responsive argument provides 
the court with references and case law which support the fact 
that he identified reasons justifying set aside of the Default 
Judgment in the lower court, that his claims are consistent with 
Rule 60(b)(6) and (7), U.R.C.P., that his claim of accord and 
satisfaction is valid and that defendant raised issues involving 
Rule 4(e), U.R.C.P., in the lower court. 
IV 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT IDENTIFIED REASONS JUSTIFYING 
SET ASIDE OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT. 
While plaintiff alleges that defendant failed to identify 
any reason justifying relief from the Default Judgment pursuant 
to Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P., such is not the case. Mr. Larsen 
specifically addressed those issues in the lower court under his 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Relief of Judgment 
(Appellant's Brief - Exhibit "L"), Defendant's Affidavit in 
Support of Motion (Appellant's Brief - Exhibit "D"), and in his 
Reply to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for 
Relief of Judgment (Exhibit "A"). 
The fact that the parties settled this matter, that 
defendant was denied proper service of process, that plaintiff 
fraudulently altered the terms of payment, that plaintiff failed 
to comply with Rule 58A(d), U.R.C.P., in regard to notice of 
default, each constitute grounds for Rule 60(b) relief. See Laub 
v. South Cent. Utah Tel. Assfn, 657 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1982). 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS WERE CONSISTENT 
WITH RULE 60(b) SUBSECTIONS (6) and (7). 
Plaintiff incorrectly argues that the verbage contained 
under Rule 60(b)(6), U.R.C.P., precludes defendant's claims. In 
fact, (b)(6) does apply, to-wit: 
The judgment has been satisifed, released, or 
discharged, or the prior judgment upon which 
it is based has been reversed or otherwise 
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application. 
Final settlement, as reached and acknowledged by the 
parties, justified the set aside of the Default Judgment. 
Defendant would further point out that Mr. Larsen claimed 
and established an undisputed lack of due process of law which 
entitled him to relief from judgment under subdivision (b)(7) of 
Rule 60, U.R.C.P., even after the expiration of three (3) months, 
because a lack of due process is not expressly provided for by 
this rule. Ref. Bishfs Sheet Metal Co. v. Luras, 359 P.2d 21 
(Utah 1961) . 
POINT III 
CLAIM OF ACCORD AND SATISFACTION 
CONSTITUTES VALID ARGUMENT. 
Plaintiff argues that satisfaction of the underlying debt 
prior to commencement of the case does not constitute 
satisfaction of the subsequent judgment obtained in regard to the 
identical matter (Appelleefs Brief, page 3). In other words, 
plaintiff asserts that he is justified in collecting twice under 
the same claim provided that he can effectively manipulate the 
court and the parties. Defendant disagrees. Plaintiff's course 
of improper conduct in this matter not only calls for set aside 
of the Default Judgment, but for summary disposition of the 
matter in defendant's favor. 
It was held in Sugarhouse Fin. Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 
1369 (Utah 1980), that the issue of accord and satisfaction may 
be raised seeking direct judicial sanction of satisfaction by 
motion under Rule 60(b)(6), U.R.C.P. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT RAISED ISSUES IN THE LOWER 
COURT PURSUANT TO RULE 4(e), U.R.C.P. 
Plaintiff's assertion that issues involving Rule 4(e), 
U.R.C.P., were not raised in the lower court are incorrect. 
Defendant raised these matters under Defendant's Reply to 
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Relief of 
Judgment (Exhibit "A"), Defendant Larsen's Affidavit (Appellant's 
Brief - Exhibit "D", paras. 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, and 9), as well as in 
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Relief of 
Judgment (Appellant's Brief - Exhibit "L", Point I), the 
responsive Affidavit of Cary Draper (Appellant's Brief - Exhibit 
"F"), further supports defendant's contentions in this regard. 
In this instance, plaintiff has never disputed the failure of 
proper service of Summons and Complaint pursuant to Rule 4(e), 
U.R.C.P., as alleged by defendant. In Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 
288 Utah 1986), it was held that where judgment is void because 
of a fatally defective service of process, the time limitations 
under Rule 60(b) have no application. See Woody v. Rhodes, 461 
P.2d 465 (Utah 1969). Given the facts of this matter, default 
could be set aside pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) (3) and (4), as well 
as (6) and (7), U.R.C.P. 
The court held in Fibreboard Paper Prods, Corp. v. Dietrich, 
475 P.2d 1005 (Utah 1970), that Default Judgment was properly set 
aside where the trial court failed to obtain jurisdiction over 
defendant for failure to properly issue Summons and Complaint. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing argument and that contained in 
Appellant's Brief, there is no question that defendant is 
entitled to the granting of his appeal. Defendant Larsen 
respectfully requests the court to find that the Circuit Court 
erred in failing to set aside the Default Judgment based upon the 
existence of a prior settlement, that unilateral alteration of 
the money order by plaintiff did not justify further litigation, 
that plaintiff's subsequent failure to notice defendant of 
actions taken pursuant to Rule 58A(d), U.R.C.P., justified 
consideration for setting aside default and that failure of 
proper service of Summons and Complaint justifies set aside of 
default. 
The Default Judgment as entered must also be set aside to 
avoid the prospect of allowing the plaintiff to succeed in an 
improper and wrongful attempt to collect twice under the same 
claim. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
DOUGLAS E. LARSEN 
Defendant Pro-Se 
1817 South Main Street, Suite 8 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Telephone: (801) 484-1344 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
N.A.R., LC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DOUG LARSEN, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S REPLY TO 
PLAINTIFFfS MEMORANDUM 
IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION 
FOR RELIEF OF JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 940013590CV 
Judge Phillip K. Palmer 
Defendant Douglas E. Larsen hereby submits the following 
reply to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion 
for Relief of Judgment. 
MATERIAL FACTS 
The following supplemental facts are submitted for the 
consideration of the court, based upon plaintiff's response: 
1. The affidavit of Cary Draper confirms the fact that she 
appeared at 1817 South Main Street for service of Summons and 
Complaint and improperly issued those papers by pushing them 
through a mail slot to "someone" behind a door. (Ref. -
affidavit at para. 4.) 
2. Plaintiff acknowledges that "plaintiff crossed out the 
restrictive language on the face of the money order" and cashed 
it. (Ref. - plaintiff's memo.) 
3. That plaintiff, having sent a third party to serve 
Summons and Complaint at 1817 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, on October 26, 1994, and acknowledging a telephone communi-
cation with Mr. Larsen's secretary at that address, later mailed 
Notice of Default and Default Judgment to Mr. Larsen's former 
address at 225 South 200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, on December 
7, 1994. (Exhibit "A". ) 
4. That plaintiff acknowledges that its mailing of Notice 
of Default and Default Judgment, which were mailed to the in-
corre.ct address, were returned marked "forwarding order expired." 
(Ref. - plaintiff's memo, in opposition.) 
5. That plaintiff subsequently served its Order in Supple-
mental Proceedings to defendant's correct 1817 South Main Street 
address in April, 1995. 
6. That plaintiff failed to advise defendant of its action 
in unilaterally modifying the demonination of full and final 
payment on that document prior to cashing it or after, until m e 
memorandum in opposition was submitted to the court on June 5, 
1995. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Plaintiff's action in either knowingly and willfully or 
erroneously forwarding Notice of Default and Default Judgment to 
defendant's prior address of 225 South 200 East, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, clearly and specifically violates Rule 58A(d), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. In admitting that its mailing was subse-
quently returned, marked "forwarding order expired", plaintiff 
should have looked at the mailing address to verify its correct-
ness. Failing that, plaintiff should have called defendant's 
working telephone number that plaintiff had previously used, to 
advise defendant. As it stands, plaintiff proceeded with the 
express knowledge that it failed to meet the requirement under 
Rule 58A(d), and did nothing about it. Plaintiff's actions also 
violate Rule 4-504(2 ) (4 )(8) , Code of Judicial Administration in 
regard to fundamental notice requirements. 
POINT II 
Plaintiff knowingly and willfully altered defendant's full 
and final payment by crossing out the restrictive language con-
tained on the money order, without defendant's express knowledge. 
The money order, as forwarded by Mr. Larsen, constituted full and 
final settlement of claim and plaintiff's action in modifying 
that payment, cashing the check and then proceeding with the 
complaint, all without noticing defendant, constitutes a pattern 
of improper and deceitful conduct. 
POINT III 
Not only did plaintiff act to defendant's damage and detri-
ment in secretly altering defendant's payment and failing to 
notify him of that fact, plaintiff hid the fact that default was 
entered until April, 1995, when the Order in Supplemental Pro-
ceedings was served at Mr. Larsen1s correct address. Plaintiff, 
with the knowledge that Rule 60(b)(l)(2)(3)(4), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, provides that a Motion for Relief from Judgment 
must be entered within ninety (90) days of judgment, waited from 
December 7, 1994, to April 14, 1995, to notice defendant of any 
action having been taken in order to diminish his ability to 
contest the matter. 
POINT IV 
Defendant agrees with the principal of accord and satisfac-
tion in this matter in that, "The condition that if it is 
accepted, it is to be in full satisfaction, and the condition 
must be such that to whom the offer is made is bound to under-
stand that if he accepts it, he does so subject to the conditions 
imposed . . . the accord is the agreement and the satisfaction is 
the execution or performance of such agreement . . . Cannon v. 
Stevens School of Business, Inc., 560 P.2d 1383 (1977). The 
money order, as delivered, was in full satisfaction of plain-
tiff's claim, plaintiff accepted it and executed payment by 
cashing it, thereby acknowledging full and final acceptance. 
Plaintiff's unilateral and secret modification of the terms and 
conditions included does not legally alter discharge of the 
claim. 
POINT V 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that every 
pleading, motion and other paper represented by an attorney 
constitutes a certification by him that he has read the pleading, 
motion or paper, that to the best of his knowledge and belief, 
formed after reasonable inquiry is well grounded in fact and 
warranted by existing law and that it is not interposed for any 
improper purpose such as to harass, delay or impose needless 
increase in the cost of litigation. As a businessman in this 
community, defendant is aware that it has become a routine event 
for attorneys, especially those affiliated with the collection 
agencies, to act improperly, using the courts, to abuse the 
public in the same fashion as plaintiff's counsel has proceeded 
against him. Not only has plaintiff and/or its attorney ignored 
any fundamental rights under the law, they have proceeded in a 
deceitful manner in doing so. While defendant also understands 
that the courts seldom issue sanctions under Rule 11, which would 
go a long way to stopping attorney's wrongful use of the system 
in order to protect fellow members of the Bar, Mr. Larsen asks 
the court to consider Rule 11 sanctions at this time. See Clark 
v. Booth, 168 Utah Adv. Rep. (1991); Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 
770 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Walker v. Carlson, 740 P.2d 
1372 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing facts and applicable law, defendant 
asks the court to grant defendant's Motion for Relief from 
Judgment, and for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
DATED this /^2 day of June, 1995. 
DOUGLASS E. LARSEN 
Defendant Pro Se 
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